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Fred Zacharias was prescient on the subject of federalism and the
regulation of lawyers. Fifteen years ago, he recognized the seriousness
of the problem and carefully presented the ramifications of the issue,
focused mainly on contrasting rules of professional conduct. Fred’s
article appeared in the Texas Law Review, the student publication of my
own law school,1 and it was typical of his thoughtful writing. Fred was a
remarkable person. We first met thirty-five years ago while I was a
supervising attorney and teaching fellow at Yale Law School, and Fred
was a second-semester law student, interested in the clinical program at
the Federal Correctional Institution at Danbury, then a men’s prison. I
supervised Fred in some of his early clinic work. He was serious,
thoughtful, and thorough—attributes that characterized his later career as
an academic. After I joined the Texas faculty that fall, Fred continued
his representation of federal inmates under the student practice rule and

* Raybourne Thompson Centennial Professor in Law, The University of Texas.
I presented an earlier version at a conference entitled “Regulating and Deregulating
Lawyers in the 21st Century” at the Institute of Advanced Legal Studies, University of
London, on June 3, 2010. I served for a decade on the Bar Admissions Committee of the
American Bar Association (ABA) Section of Legal Education and Admissions to the
Bar, and was a member of subcommittees that drafted the model rule for admission on
motion of attorneys from other states, which was adopted by the ABA House of Delegates in
2002; the model rule updating the Model Rule for the Licensing and Practice of Foreign
Legal Consultants, which was adopted in 2006; and the Model Rule for Registration of
In-House Counsel, which was adopted in 2008. I am no longer a member of the
committee, and the views expressed in this Article are my own and do not reflect the
opinions of the committee or the section.
1. Fred C. Zacharias, Federalizing Legal Ethics, 73 TEX. L. REV. 335 (1994).
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secured important constitutional rights for his clients.2 Fred kept me
informed about his remarkable, prolific academic career, and along with
others, I received offprints of his many publications. This short Article
dealing with an aspect of federalism and the regulation of lawyers is
dedicated to his memory.
With the expansion of lawyers from the United States practicing
elsewhere and with the creation of the World Trade Organization (WTO)
and the accompanying negotiation for a General Agreement on Trade in
Services (GATS), there has been a call for greater flexibility in the
admission of non-United States lawyers in the various bars of the states.
Various constituencies within the American Bar Association (ABA)
have called for modifications in the qualifications for admission of
foreign attorneys and have suggested that the states would have to alter
their practices to recognize the globalization of legal practice. There
have been some suggestions that the GATS negotiations would force
changes on the states through the actions of the United States Trade
Representative (USTR) as part of a resulting international agreement.3
Although this drumbeat has been constant, there has been only limited
discussion as to whether and under what circumstances the states could
be forced to admit foreign lawyers. In addition, states have been moving
on their own in the direction of more flexibility in setting forth criteria
for admission to the bar, although most of the activity has been to enable
lawyers from different states to practice or gain admission in other states.
This Article will discuss these aspects of the question of the regulation
of lawyers.
A 1971 United States Supreme Court decision, Younger v. Harris,
breathed life to the term “Our Federalism.”4
[It] does not mean blind deference to “States’ Rights” any more than it means
centralization of control over every important issue in our National Government
and its courts. The Framers rejected both these courses. What the concept does
represent is a system in which there is sensitivity to the legitimate interests of
both State and National Governments . . . .5

Almost thirty years later, the Court noted in the context of the reach of
a federal bankruptcy statute: “Although the Constitution grants broad
powers to Congress, our federalism requires that Congress treat the
States in a manner consistent with their status as residuary sovereigns
2. See Moskowitz v. Wilkinson, 432 F. Supp. 947 (D. Conn. 1977); Maguire v.
Wilkinson, 405 F. Supp. 637 (D. Conn 1975).
3. See generally Laurel S. Terry, GATS’ Applicability to Transnational Lawyering
and Its Potential Impact on U.S. State Regulation of Lawyers, 34 VAND. J. TRANSNAT’L
L. 989 (2001). Professor Terry has been a prolific author on the subject of GATS.
4. Younger v. Harris, 401 U.S. 37, 44 (1971).
5. Id.
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and joint participants in the governance of the Nation.”6 With the
increasing globalization of the legal profession, the question that remains
is what is the role of the various states concerning limitations on legal
practice and whether certain actions of the federal government might
trump the states’ role.
There are those in the organized bar who would wish away the states’
power over the regulation of the admission of lawyers to practice in their
respective jurisdictions. The American Bar Association continually has,
at a minimum, advocated the control of practice by the states, while
exhorting them to adopt model rules to broaden practice rules and
maintaining its monopoly on accreditation of law schools in the United
States.7 Some states independently have taken the lead and expanded
the ability of nonstate and non-United States lawyers to practice in their
jurisdictions.
A series of decisions by the Supreme Court during the last several
decades lend support to the basic independence of states in this area, and
one might conclude that, if push came to shove, the states might even
prevail against GATS and the United States Trade Representative. The
starting point is a summary reversal by the Supreme Court in a situation
where several prominent New York lawyers were hired by Larry Flynt
to defend him against an Ohio criminal prosecution. The difficulty was
the fact that these individuals were not admitted to practice in
neighboring Ohio, and the Ohio courts had refused pro hac vice
admission without a hearing. The United States Court of Appeals for the
Sixth Circuit had affirmed an order of the federal district court directing

6. Alden v. Maine, 527 U.S. 706, 748 (1999).
7. AM. BAR ASS’N COMM’N ON MULTIJURISDICTIONAL PRACTICE, REPORT 201A
(2002), http://www.americanbar.org/content/dam/aba/migrated/cpr/mjp/201a.authcheck
dam.pdf (“[ABA] affirms its support for the principle of state judicial regulation of the
practice of law.”). But see AM. BAR ASS’N STANDING COMM. ON PROF’L DISCIPLINE,
REPORT 105, Recommendation 2 (2006), http://www.abanet.org/leadership/2006/annual/
onehundredfive.doc (supporting the USTR’s participation in developing “additional
disciplines on domestic regulation that . . . do not unreasonably impinge on the
regulatory authority of the states’ highest courts of appellate jurisdiction over the legal
profession in the United States”). The Conference of Chief Justices unsuccessfully
urged that unreasonably be stricken from the resolution.
See Resolution 5,
C ONFERENCE OF C HIEF J USTICES (Aug. 2, 2006), http://ccj.ncsc.dni.us/Independence
ofStateJudicialSystems/resol5GATS.html.
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such a hearing on their motion. However, the Supreme Court granted
certiorari and, without oral argument, reversed the lower federal courts.8
The per curiam opinion concluded that there was no substantial
federal question at issue because there “is no right of federal origin that
permits such lawyers to appear in state courts without meeting that
State’s bar admission requirements.”9 The summary nature of the decision
is all the more surprising because it involves a criminal defendant’s
desire to have particular counsel represent him. The Court shows little
sympathy for this position. The Court rejects any notion of a right to
cross-jurisdiction practice: “Such an asserted right flies in the face of the
traditional authority of state courts to control who may be admitted to
practice before them.”10
In 1985, the Court reaffirmed the validity of its holding. In striking
down New Hampshire’s rules that limited bar admission to residents,
thus excluding an adjacent Vermont resident, Justice Powell summarized
the Court’s position in Leis: “We concluded that the States should be left
free to ‘prescribe the qualifications for admission to practice and the
standards of professional conduct’ for those lawyers who appear in its
courts. . . . The nonresident who seeks to join a bar . . . must have the
same professional and personal qualifications required of resident lawyers.”11
Fast forward twenty years to 2006. The Supreme Court was confronted
with a situation where both the defendant and the United States agreed
that a trial judge had erroneously disqualified pro hac vice counsel; the
question was on remedy. The Court majority and dissent emphasized
“[n]othing we have said today casts any doubt or places any
qualification upon our previous holdings that limit the right to counsel of
choice . . . . Nor may a defendant insist on representation by a person
who is not a member of the bar.”12
Thus, the Supreme Court has never retreated from its broad deference
to the states in the Leis case. A decision from 2008 buttresses the role of
the states under our federalism.13 This time the question before the
Court involved the purported authority of the President in the field of
foreign affairs against the position of a state. There was no question that
Texas had violated its obligations under the Vienna Convention on
Consular Relations when a noncitizen defendant had not been told of his
8. See Leis v. Flynt, 439 U.S. 438, 438 (1979) (per curiam). Justice White would
have set the case for oral argument, and three Justices dissented. Id. at 445.
9. Id. at 443.
10. Id. at 444 n.5.
11. Supreme Court of New Hampshire v. Piper, 470 U.S. 274, 283–84 n.16 (1985).
12. United States v. Gonzales-Lopez, 548 U.S. 140, 151–52 (2006); see also id. at
160 (Alito, J., dissenting) (citing Leis, 439 U.S. at 433).
13. See Medellin v. Texas, 552 U.S. 491 (2008).
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right to contact a consular official.14 Ultimately, the defendant had been
sentenced to death.15 The International Court of Justice (ICJ) had ordered
the United States to ascertain whether there had been any effect on the
conviction and sentence as a result of the violation of the Convention.16
In a formal Memorandum to the Attorney General, President George W.
Bush directed the Department of Justice to secure compliance with the
ICJ’s judgment.17 Upon request, the Texas Court of Criminal Appeals
declined to comply, finding that the issue had been procedurally defaulted
and that the President had no authority to direct Texas to modify its
procedure.18
Speaking for the Court, Chief Justice Roberts wrote an opinion that
affirmed the Texas court. Noting the broad power the President has in
matters of foreign relations, he concluded that “[t]he responsibility for
transforming an international obligation arising from a non-self-executing
treaty into domestic law falls to Congress.”19 Furthermore:
[T]he Government has not identified a single instance in which the President
has attempted (or Congress has acquiesced in) a Presidential directive issued to
state courts, much less one that reaches deep into the heart of the State’s police
powers and compels state courts to reopen final criminal judgments and set
aside neutrally applicable state laws. The Executive’s narrow and strictly limited
authority to settle international claims disputes pursuant to an executive agreement
cannot stretch so far as to support the current Presidential Memorandum.20

There are several parallels to the WTO and GATS situation. The
WTO dispute mechanism is not a self-executing treaty. Furthermore,
Section 102(b) of the Uruguay Round Agreements Act, setting in motion
United States participation, states:
No State law, or the application of such a State law, may be declared invalid
as to any person or circumstance on the ground that the provision or application
is inconsistent with any of the Uruguay Round Agreements, except in an action
brought by the United States for the purpose of declaring such law or application
invalid.21

14.
15.
16.
17.
18.
19.
20.
21.

Id. at 501.
Id.
Id. at 502–03.
Id. at 503.
Id. at 504.
Id. at 525–26.
Id. at 532.
19 U.S.C. § 3512(b)(2)(A) (2006); see also, e.g., JEANNE J. GRIMMETT, CONG.
RESEARCH SERV., RS22154, WTO DECISIONS AND THEIR EFFECT IN U.S. LAW 4 (2005).
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The reference in Medellin to “heart of the State’s police powers”22 finds
a ready parallel with many Court statements about the power of states to
regulate admission to the bar. It would seem that the USTR could not
unilaterally negotiate away the requirements for admission to the bar and
independently force implementation on the states.
This is not to suggest that the federal government is impotent when its
own interests are at stake. I just suggest that, at minimum, it probably
would take an act of Congress to override state authority for a GATS
agreement. Congress has evidenced its ability to so act in another
context involving cross-jurisdiction practice within the United States.
For example, in 2005, Congress passed a measure as part of the
Department of Defense Authorization Act that permitted military personnel
to provide legal assistance to members of the armed services, their
dependents, and their survivors as well as some civilian employees:
(d)(1) Notwithstanding any law regarding the licensure of attorneys, a judge
advocate or civilian attorney who is authorized to provide military legal assistance is
authorized to provide that assistance in any jurisdiction, subject to such regulations as
may be prescribed by the Secretary concerned.
(2) Military legal assistance may be provided only by a judge advocate or a
civilian attorney who is a member of the bar of a Federal court or of the highest
court of a State.23

The Senate report noted that “questions have been raised by some as
to whether attorneys providing such assistance outside the States in
which they are licensed are engaging in the unauthorized practice of law.
This provision would codify the long-accepted practice with respect to
the provision of legal assistance.”24 The federal interest in the maintenance
of its armed services trumped any state rule limiting the practice of
attorneys.
The focus has been on the activities of the states in looking at GATS.
However, there is another avenue. There is separate admission to the
various bars of the federal district courts for each district.25 Certainly
this is an exclusively federal sphere. Just as the Supreme Court has
indicated that it is not the business of the states concerning regulation of
lawyers who practice exclusively under the rules of the Patent Office,26
State law “includes any provision of a state constitution, regulation, practice or other state
measure.” H.R. DOC. NO. 103-316, at 674 (1994).
22. 552 U.S. at 532.
23. 10 U.S.C. § 1044(d)(1)–(2) (2006).
24. S. REP. NO. 109-69, at 317 (2005) (construing section 553).
25. Local court rules, which include requirements for admission to each federal
court, are collected at the United States Courts website. Local Rules, UNITED STATES COURTS,
http://www.uscourts.gov/RulesAndPolicies/FederalRulemaking/LocalCourtRules.aspx
(last visited Jan. 5, 2011).
26. Sperry v. Florida ex rel. Florida Bar, 373 U.S. 379, 404 (1963).
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so too would admission to practice before the various federal bars be
outside the jurisdiction of the states. The federal government could
permit foreign attorney admission to the various federal bars, presumably
either through Judicial Conference rulemaking27 or by statute.
The GATS negotiations traditionally have focused on the use of
foreign legal consultants (FLC)—foreign lawyers in good standing in
their home countries.28 These individuals have a separate status but are
not admitted to the bar and are limited in what they can do. They can
provide advice on the law of their home countries. They may not appear
in state courts—without special permission—and usually may not be
involved with real estate transactions or wills.29 Not surprisingly,
despite enactment by more than half of the states, the number of FLCs in
most jurisdictions is rather small. Occasionally, there are disciplinary
actions where the FLC crosses the line and acts contrary to the rule as a
local state lawyer.30
There has been a charm offensive by some foreign bars to obtain
approval in the United States. For example, the organized bar of Australia,
the Law Council of Australia, attended sessions of the Conference of
Chief Justices and lobbied heavily to arrange some form of admission,
including inviting state judges to Australia for meetings. The conference
passed resolutions in 2007 urging state boards of law examiners to
consider permitting Australian attorneys to sit for the bar examination in
various states and in 2009 to consider some form of reciprocity.31
The focus for foreign attorneys and those advocating for them has
been to permit temporary practice, to admit to the bar on motion, or to
enable individuals to sit for a bar examination. The ABA Commission
on Multijurisdictional Practice’s 2002 Report to the ABA House of

27.
28.

28 U.S.C. § 2072 (2006).
See MARGARET MIKYUNG LEE, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., RS22949, LEGAL
SERVICES IN THE WORLD TRADE ORGANIZATION (WTO) AND U.S. EFFECT (2008); see
generally AM. BAR ASS’N COMM’N ON MULTIJURISDICTIONAL PRACTICE, REPORT 201H, at
2 (2002) [hereinafter REPORT 201H], available at http://www.abanet.org/cpr/mjp/201h.
pdf; Foreign Legal Consultant Rules, ABANET.ORG (Aug. 24, 2010), http://www.abanet.
org/cpr/mjp/for_legal_consultants.pdf.
29. REPORT 201H, supra note 28, at 3–4.
30. See, e.g., Dep’t Disciplinary Comm. v. Antoine, 899 N.Y.S.2d 41, 44 (N.Y.
App. Div. 2010).
31. Resolution 7, CONFERENCE OF CHIEF JUSTICES (Feb. 7, 2007), http://ccj.ncsc.
dni.us/LegalEducationResolutions/resol7AustralianLawyersStateBarExams.html;
Resolution 13, CONFERENCE OF CHIEF JUSTICES (Aug. 2009), http://ccj.ncsc.dni.us/
InternationalResolutions/resol13.html.
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Delegates included a model rule for temporary practice by foreign
lawyers32 in addition to a model rule for admission on motion for those
within the United States.33 The latter originated in the Bar Admissions
Committee of the Section of Legal Education and Admissions to the Bar,
but the former never was vetted to the same extent through that section
or that committee. Both passed the House of Delegates, but the former
has picked up only a small number of enactments. In contrast, the latter
has been approved by an increasing number of jurisdictions approaching
80%. Similarly, about 80% of the states have enacted ABA-recommended
safe harbor provisions for lawyers in the United States engaged in shortterm representation of clients in states in which they are not admitted.34
The safe harbor provision does not extend to non-United States attorneys,
and few states permit its application to foreign attorneys.35
Sitting for the bar examination has become a cottage industry for
foreign attorneys in New York. About one-third of the applicants in the
February 2010 cycle received their legal education outside the United
States,36 while almost 3000 foreign-educated individuals took the July
2010 exam, representing one-quarter of all examinees.37 New York
permits individuals who have completed a graduate law degree—usually
one year of study—from a common law jurisdiction to sit for the bar.38
The pass rate is considerably lower than that for domestic applicants.39
Many want the credential and do not follow through with the character

32. AM. BAR ASS’N COMM’N ON MULTIJURISDICTIONAL PRACTICE, REPORT 201J, at
1 (2002), available at http://www.abanet.org/cpr/mjp/201j.pdf.
33. AM. BAR ASS’N COMM’N ON MULTIJURISDICTIONAL PRACTICE, REPORT 201G, at
1 (2002), available at http://www.abanet.org/cpr/mjp/report-201g.pdf.
34. See AM. BAR ASS’N COMM’N ON MULTIJURISDICTIONAL PRACTICE, REPORT
201B (2002), available at http://www.abanet.org/cpr/mjp/201b.pdf; see also State
Implementation of ABA Model Rule 5.5, ABANET.ORG (Jan. 25, 2010), http://www.
abanet.org/cpr/mjp/quick-guide_5.5.pdf.
35. There has been a new model rule for registration of in-house counsel that
originated in the Bar Admissions Committee and was passed by the House of Delegates
in 2008; once again the model rule’s focus is United States attorneys. AM. BAR ASS’N
SECTION OF LEGAL EDUC. & A DMISSIONS TO THE B AR , REPORT TO THE HOUSE OF
DELEGATES 1–3 (2008), available at http://www.abanet.org/cpr/mjp/in-house_registration.
pdf. For adoptions, see In-House Corporate Counsel Rules, ABANET.ORG (Apr. 12,
2010), http://www.abanet.org/cpr/mjp/in-house_rules.pdf.
36. Conversation with Diane Bosse, Chair, N.Y. Bd. of Law Exam’rs, in Austin,
Tex. (April 15, 2010).
37. Press Release, N.Y. State Bd. of Law Exam’rs, New York Bar Examination
Pass Rates July 2010 (Nov. 5, 2010), available at http://www.nybarexam.org/Results
710/Jul2010Results.htm.
38. N.Y. State Bd. of Law Exam’rs, Foreign Legal Education, NYBAREXAM.ORG,
http://www.nybarexam.org/Foreign/ForeignLegalEducation.htm (last visited Jan. 5, 2011).
39. For example, the July 2010 pass rate was about thirty percentage points lower
for foreign educated exam takers. See Press Release, N.Y. State Bd. of Law Exam’rs,
New York Bar Examination Pass Rates July 2010, supra note 37.
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and fitness portions of the New York bar, which takes place after
passage of the examination, rather than prior to the exam as in most
states. LL.M. programs generally are cash cows for United States law
schools.40 There is no accreditation of LL.M. programs in the United
States. Rather the only interest of the ABA Council of the Section of
Legal Education and Admissions to the Bar—the accrediting body—is
that the LL.M. program does not adversely affect the Juris Doctor
program. There have been some calls for the ABA to accredit these
programs, particularly because they have become a vehicle in some
states for individuals to sit for the bar examinations.41 There also has
been some interest in the ABA becoming involved in the accreditation of
non-United States law schools, and in 2009 the Conference of Chief
Justices urged the ABA Section of Legal Education and Admissions to
the Bar to consider developing a certification program for legal education
providers in common law countries.42 The ABA has only looked at
United States programs abroad, often conducted in concert with nonUnited States law schools. However, accreditation would be a huge
increase in jurisdiction for the ABA and would require extended and
increased resources. As a first step, there has been some support for
accreditation consideration of a non-United States law school that claims
to be in full compliance with existing ABA standards.43 The council is
currently considering this issue.44

40. As one commentator has indicated:
Law schools compete based in part on admission statistics, including LSAT
scores and grade point averages, which are collected and publicized with regard to
J.D. students but not with regard to LL.M. students. As a result, enrollments in
LL.M. programs can contribute much needed tuition dollars without affecting
admission statistics.
Carole Silver, The Case of the Foreign Lawyer: Internationalizing the U.S. Legal Profession,
25 FORDHAM INT’L L.J. 1039, 1053 n.43 (2002); see also id. at 1053 n.42 (describing
LL.M. programs as “cash cows”).
41. See AM. BAR ASS’N SECTION OF LEGAL EDUC. & ADMISSIONS TO THE BAR,
REPORT OF THE SPECIAL COMMITTEE ON INTERNATIONAL ISSUES 27 (2009), available at
http://www.abanet.org/legaled/accreditation/International%20Issues%20Report%20(fina
l)%20(2).DOC.
42. Resolution 8, CONFERENCE OF CHIEF JUSTICES (Feb. 7, 2007), http://ccj.ncsc.dni.us/
LegalEducationResolutions/resol8AccredLegalEducCommonLawCountries.html.
43. See AM. BAR ASS’N SECTION OF LEGAL EDUC. & ADMISSIONS TO THE BAR,
supra note 41, at 28 (referring to Peking University School of Transnational Law).
44. See Council Adopts Resolution on Accreditation of Foreign Law Schools, AM.
BAR ASS’N, http://www.abanet.org/legaled/home.html (Dec. 2010 resolution) (last visited Jan.
5, 2011).
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Of course, the elephant in the room is how can states adhere to a
requirement that United States bar candidates for admission be graduated
from ABA-accredited schools and admit attorneys from abroad who do
not have a similar accrediting body? Would not a graduate from a nonABA-accredited school insist that she be treated in the same manner?45
Would the whole accrediting process collapse if there would be an endrun around the process?
The activity that has involved state boards of law examiners recently
concerning potential multijurisdictional practice has been an effort to
create a uniform bar examination. Without much fanfare, the Bar
Admissions Committee of the ABA Section of Legal Education and
Admissions to the Bar began discussing the possibility at its meetings in
2006 and 2007, and there was general interest and support.46 The
National Conference of Bar Examiners (NCBE) solicited interest among
the states and held a meeting in January 2008 in New Orleans for
individuals from those jurisdictions expressing an interest. There also
was a presentation to the Conference of Chief Justices and another meeting
in Madison, Wisconsin, in June 2009. The catalyst was that increasing
numbers of states were using products of the NCBE as components of
their respective bar exams: Multistate Bar Exam, Multistate Essay Exam,
Multistate Practical Training Exam, and the Multistate Professional
Responsibility Exam. A committee of the NCBE came up with uniform
criteria—the MBE would be weighted 50%.47 Nineteen states already
use all four NCBE products, and Missouri and North Dakota are in the
vanguard. Different states will have different cut scores, but there
should be improved portability.48
States have taken the subject of multijurisdictional practice seriously
and have taken significant strides in that regard.49 The question of the
45. For example, Minnesota currently is studying this question. See MINN. STATE
BD. OF LAW EXAM’RS, LEGAL EDUC. COMM. OF THE MINN. BD. OF LAW EXAM’RS,
http://www.ble.state.mn.us/resource-center/legal-education-committee.aspx (last visited Jan.
5, 2011).
46. The Bar Admissions Committee includes state supreme court justices, heads of
boards of law examiners, deans, faculty, and members of the practicing bar. While I was
on the committee, we met twice a year and worked well together.
47. Jurisdictions may require a continuing legal education course as a prerequisite,
some online training, or perhaps even further examination on state law.
48. See generally, Susan M. Case, The Uniform Bar Examination: What’s In It for
Me?, B. EXAMINER, Feb. 2010, at 50, 50; Essays on a Uniform Bar Examination, B.
EXAMINER, Feb. 2009, at 6; see also Leigh Jones, Uniform Bar Examination Drawing
Closer to Reality, NAT’L L.J., Oct. 12, 2009, at 1, 4. The NCBE now has a webpage on
the UBE. See Uniform Bar Examination (UBE), NAT’L CONFERENCE OF BAR EXAM’RS,
http://www.ncbex.org/multistate-tests/ube/ (last visited Jan. 5, 2011).
49. See, e.g., Arthur F. Greenbaum, Multijurisdictional Practice and the Influence
of Model Rule of Professional Conduct 5.5—An Interim Assessment, 43 AKRON L. REV.
729 (2010).
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admission of foreign lawyers has not yet galvanized the same core
support. The failure to date of the Doha round on GATS50 has lessened
the effect of the clarion call for action to open up state bars to nonUnited States attorneys. However, the drumbeat of particularly the
United States international bar has kept the issue front and center.51
Some in ABA leadership attempted to push multidisciplinary practice a
decade ago, but it fell on deaf ears.52 It will be interesting to see how the
call for the admission of foreign attorneys will play. In 2009, the ABA
president created a commission, Ethics 20/20, to study globalization,
technology, and the Model Rules of Professional Conduct. Its report is
due in 2012, and it will make recommendations on many of the issues
discussed in this Article.53

50. Editorial, Waiting for a Trade Policy, N.Y. TIMES, July 6, 2010, at A22 (“[T]he
G-20 leaders dropped their 2009 pledge to finalize the Doha round of trade negotiations
this year.”).
51. See, e.g., Anthony E. Davis, Regulation of the Legal Profession in the United
States and the Future of Global Law Practice, 19 PROF. LAW, no. 2, 2009 at 1.
52. See ABA House of Delegates Revised Recommendation 10 F by Various State
and Local Bars, A M . B AR A SS ’ N (July 2000), http://www.abanet.org/cpr/mdp/
(recommending dismantling the ABA Commission on Multidisciplinary Practice).
53. For commission activities to date, see ABA Commission on Ethics 20/20, AM.
BAR ASS’N, http://www.abanet.org/ethics2020 (last visited Jan. 5, 2011).
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